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Research Engagement after Disasters: 
Research Coordination Before, During, and 
after the 2010–2011 Canterbury Earthquake 
Sequence, New Zealand 
Sarah Beaven1,2, Thomas Wilson1,2, Lucy Johnston3, David Johnston4,5, 
Richard Smith6.  
This article argues that active coordination of research engagement after 
disasters has the potential to maximize research opportunities, improve research 
quality, increase end-user engagement, and manage escalating research activity to 
mitigate ethical risks posed to impacted populations. The focus is on the 
coordination of research activity after the 22nd February 2011 Mw6.2 
Christchurch earthquake by the then newly-formed national research consortium, 
the Natural Hazards Research Platform, which included a social science research 
moratorium during the declared state of national emergency. Decisions defining 
this organisation’s functional and structural parameters are analyzed to identify 
lessons concerning the need for systematic approaches to the management of post 
disaster research, in collaboration with the response effort. Other lessons include 
the importance of involving an existing, broadly-based research consortium, 
ensuring that this consortium's coordination role is fully integrated into 
emergency management structures, and ensuring that all aspects of decision-
making processes are transparent and easily accessed.  
INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) defines 
disaster as the ‘serious disruption of the functioning of a community or society involving 
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widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds 
the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources’ (p.9 
UNISDR, 2009). The levels of uncertainty and unknowns created by this level of disruption 
make major natural disasters literally definitive of chaotic decision-making environments 
(Van de Walle & Turoff, 2008; Schloss, 2014). It follows that the immediate response to such 
events requires a degree of top down management to provide ‘emergency services and public 
assistance during or immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, reduce health impacts, 
ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected’ (p. 24 
UNISDR 2009). Research conducted in disaster impacted regions has not been routinely 
included in the activities managed as part of emergency response operations, although there 
are a few precedents for restricting research access during such operations (Quick, 1998; 
North et al., 2002;  van Zijll de Jong et al., 2011). 
There is increasing evidence, however, that high profile disasters can generate surges in 
research activity, creating a range of scientific opportunities and risks. Birkland (1998) has 
established that the politicizing effect of US earthquake disasters has triggered increases in 
research funding and activity, greater likelihood of effective policy/science collaborations, 
and greater uptake of science by policymakers. Equally, however, the focusing effect of 
disasters has also been found to escalate research activity at the expense of scientific quality, 
when large volumes of often duplicative research are produced for largely opportunistic or 
political ends (Rodriguez et al., 2007; Black, 2003; Birkland 2009). The convergence of 
researchers into a disaster zone, moreover, has been identified as a significant additional 
burden on regions struggling to cope in the aftermath of disaster (Brown & Donini, 2014; 
Walton-Ellery & Rashid, 2012; Sumathipala et al., 2010; Brun, 2009; Gill et al., 2007; 
Sumathipala & Siribaddana, 2005).  The Belmont Report (1979) provided three principles 
that continue to mark ethical limits beyond which researchers are not free to collect scientific 
data. Research participants must be fully informed about the risks, implications and outcomes 
of participating, and have granted consent on that basis (the informed consent principle). 
Research activity must not only not do harm to participating individuals or groups – it should 
also actively provide benefits (the beneficence principle). Thirdly, the distributive justice 
principle dictates that research should not be conducted if it puts groups at risk of bearing 
“unequal burdens in research” because of their “ready availability in settings where research 
is conducted” (p. 1419, Sumathipala & Siribaddana, 2005; citing Belmont Report, 1979; see 
also Gill et al., 2007, and Brown & Donini 2014). Finding that increased research activity in 
 Page 3 of 34 
 
disaster zones risks breaching both the beneficence and distributive justice principles, several 
ethicists have called for more active interventions to manage such activity, with a view to 
reducing this risk after disasters (Sumathipala & Siribaddana, 2005; Citraningtyas et al., 
2010; Sumathipala et al., 2010). 
The recent UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 has noted that 
a ‘steady rise’ in disaster exposure and losses in all countries over the last decade lends 
urgency to the need for national organisational structures to coordinate disaster risk 
reduction, and support the science/policy interface for decision-making in this area (p.2, 
UNISDR 2015). In this article, research engagement after the 22nd February 2011 Mw 6.2 
Christchurch earthquake is used to explore a particular instance in which a national 
coordinating organisation, the Natural Hazards Research Platform (NHRP), was used to 
support this interface, and manage the mix of scientific opportunity and risk generated by this 
disaster event. Two weeks after the Christchurch Earthquake a national directive required 
that social scientists refrain from contacting impacted populations during the two-month state 
of national emergency. Indexing the issue of escalating pressure from international 
researchers after disasters, this directive also raises the question of managing such pressure in 
accordance with the principles provided by the Belmont Report (1979).  
The first section sets out the context, including the New Zealand hazard management and 
security environment, the establishment of the NHRP, and a broad outline of the 2010-2011 
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence. The second outlines research collaborations facilitated 
through the NHRP during this sequence, and provides an account of the developments that 
led up to the decision to declare a social science moratorium on the 7th March 2011, two 
weeks after the Christchurch earthquake. An analysis of the issues arising out of both this 
larger collaboration, and the directive restricting access to local populations is provided in the 
third section. The article concludes with recommendations for the coordination of research in 
disaster zones, followed by conclusions. 
MATERIALS 
The article is largely based on secondary data. This includes a range of NHRP and other 
government documentation in the public domain, including the Ministry of Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management (MCDEM) review of the emergency response and the Royal 
Commission of Enquiry into the Canterbury Earthquakes Report (Mclean et al., 2012), 
material from the National Crisis Management Center (NCMC) Log during the state of 
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national emergency (22nd February – 30th April 2011), and the Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and Economics (MBIE) review of the NHRP (Buwalda et al., 2014), as well as 
scientific and grey literature concerning the CES and its impacts, as available2. We also draw 
on observational and other data collected by the authors. All were involved in aspects of the 
larger response operation to this event, with some representing the NHRP on the science desk 
in the Christchurch Response Center (SB, TW, DJ) during the state of national emergency. 
Secondary data concerning the directive restricting research access to impacted populations 
included a number of emails and other personal communications. Due to sensitivities around 
this issue, these are not referenced individually, in order to protect the anonymity of those 
concerned. Note also that since this directive was not officially formulated, and so has no 
official title, we have chosen to term it the moratorium directive, for ease of reference, and 
reflecting common usage at the time.  
CONTEXT 
In recent decades democratic governments have faced an increasingly complex and 
fragmented policy-making environment. This has driven growing reliance on non-state 
scientific, financial and other expertise for resources and cooperation, and an associated 
emphasis on the use of evidence as the basis of policy (Gluckman, 2013; Skogstad, 2003). 
Over the same period, calls for inter-disciplinary approaches which integrate end-users in all 
stages of the research process have become widespread in a range of domains (McNie, 2007). 
A concomitant body of research has focused on integrative research/end-user initiatives, 
establishing that inevitable tensions between researchers and policy makers need to be 
negotiated, especially around the concepts of scientific credibility and political relevance 
(Cash & Moser 2000). In addition, such initiatives have been found to be equally reliant on 
the perception that knowledge-generating processes have been legitimate, or fair and 
balanced, in the treatment of diverging and conflicting stakeholder views and interests (Clark 
& Majone, 1985; Sarkki et al., 2013; Cash et al., 2003). This balance can be difficult to 
maintain, as cross-sector collaborations can create new issues that require on-going decision-
making about geographical, functional, structural and participatory parameters (Verweij et 
al., 2014). Decisions about these boundaries point back to the underlying judgments and 
expectations on which they are based, and can also create further issues as the relevant 
collaboration develops (Verweij et al. 2014).  
                                                             
2 The 1999 Fourth International Conference on Grey Literature (GL '99) in Washington, DC defines grey literature as: "That which is 
produced on all levels of government, academics, business and industry in print and electronic formats, but which is not controlled by 
commercial publishers." (www.greylit.org; accessed 1 August 2014) 
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As yet, however, there is little research into the development of ongoing cross-sector 
collaborations in the hazard and disaster research field (Few & Barclay 2011). There is also 
little research focused directly on the collaborative management of research activity after 
disasters, although there have been significant advances in this area in relation to 
humanitarian and development activity after disasters (Brown & Donini, 2014; Walton-Ellery 
& Rashid, 2012). This lack of research focus is despite a longstanding recognition of the need 
for more integrated approaches to research and policy in the disaster risk management area. 
The need for such approaches now informs most government approaches to hazard and 
disaster research funding (UNISDR 2005, Few & Barclay 2011), as well as major scientific 
initiatives by international bodies such as the International Council of Science Unions (ICSU) 
and the International Social Science Council (ISSC) (ICSU 2008). A key tenet in official 
United Nations disaster risk reduction policy for the last decade (ICSU 2008; UNISDR, 
2005, 2011), the drive to create an integrated DRR environment is the central plank of the 
2015 Sendai Framework  (UNISDR 2015). 
NZ HAZARD MANAGEMENT 
In New Zealand, a series of legislative changes has been designed to foster a more 
integrated national approach to researching and managing natural hazard and disaster risk. 
The Crown Research Institute (CRI) Act 1992 and the Earthquake Commission (EQC) Act 
1993 both regulated the provision of hazards research in the national interest. In 2002 the 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) Act built on this and other legislative 
changes to shift national hazard management “from centralized, rules-based, response 
organisations towards more flexible arrangements based on principles, culture, mitigation and 
local knowledge” (p. 70, Helm, 2009). Devolving responsibility for risk to local and regional 
levels, with the goal of building networks at, and between, those levels, this policy was 
explicitly focused on increasing the overall resilience of the larger complex system that 
includes both hazards and society (CDEM Act, 2002; Helm, 1996; 2009; Smith, 2009).  
Following the Act, collaborative arrangements were established between District, 
Regional and National levels of government during emergencies, which detailed 
engagements (at each level) between government and first response organisations (including 
the police, the army, and private lifeline providers) (MCDEM, 2005). The modular 
Coordinating Incident Management System (CIMS) introduced as a consequence of the 
subsequent Act was a nested framework, feeding from local through regional or group level 
to the national level (MCDEM, 2009). Providing the management structure used during 
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emergency response situations, this system also required that those involved in such 
responses met regularly, to train, plan and conduct exercises together. In this way it 
incorporated a regular collaborative requirement, attempting to create networks and so lay the 
groundwork for future emergency responses (Helm, 2009). 
THE NATURAL HAZARDS RESEARCH PLATFORM 
In 2007 the New Zealand research-funding environment was identified as the most highly 
competitive in the OECD (Smith, 2009). Concern about the effects of this environment gave 
new force to initiatives aiming to develop hazard and disaster research clusters in the 
response structure (MCDEM, 2009; Smith, 2009), and informed the development of the 
Natural Hazards Research Platform (NHRP) (NHRP, 2009a). Launched in 2009, the NHRP 
was a pilot platform, set up to trial the national research platform concept (NHRP, 2009a). It 
was to work towards “a New Zealand society that is more resilient to natural hazards,” and so 
further the Crown vision already articulated in MCDEM legislation (p.5, NHRP, 2009b). 
Designed to manage competitive behavior by providing a framework to integrate medium to 
long-term research and funding in areas of national interest, such platforms were expected to 
catalyse new, more collaborative networks between organisations, disciplines and agencies 
already involved in the relevant domain.  
The NHRP brought together research organisations with existing hazard and disaster 
research capacity, but distinct existing priorities. The National Institute of Weather and 
Atmospheric Research (NIWA) and the NHRP host organisation, GNS Science, are Crown-
owned companies required to conduct scientific research for the benefit of New Zealand 
(Sections 4 and 5.1(a), CRI Act, 1992). What was new about the platform was that it brought 
these CRIs together not only with Opus, a private research consultancy, but also with three of 
New Zealand’s eight universities, the Universities of Canterbury and Auckland and Massey 
University. In addition to integrating research activities across these different organisations, 
the NHRP was required to integrate relevant disciplines into five broad thematic areas. Two 
of these, risk management and social resilience, were to cut across and so integrate the three 
themes more traditionally associated with hazard and disaster management: geological 
hazards models, weather and flood prediction and resilient buildings and infrastructure 
(NHRP 2009a). 
The NHRP was guided by principles that prioritised research issues raised in particular 
government agency strategies, the endorsement of research programs by end-users, including 
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government agencies, and (where possible) the involvement of such end-users in all stages of 
the research design process (NHRP, 2009a). Other principles referred to national and 
international networking and coordination, the prioritization of integration across 
organizational, disciplinary and sector boundaries, and research of high quality (NHRP, 
2009a). The emphasis was to be on long-term research projects, and – through them – the 
development of an enduring and extensive network that would bring diverse research 
organisations and agencies together. 
As well, however, the NHRP was to be responsive to changing government priorities and 
evolving science needs. This principle included responsibility for assisting the nation to 
respond to significant hazard events, and for capitalizing on the learning opportunities such 
events create (NHRP, 2009a). Responsibility for assisting the response had been subsumed in 
the existing responsibility of the host organization, GNS Science, to provide hazard and 
disaster advice to the Crown (GNS Science, 2011). The NHRP strategy document specified 
this role explicitly, meaning that coordination of research activity during and after the 2010-
2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence fell within the remit of the NHRP.  
THE CANTERBURY EARTHQUAKE SEQUENCE (CES) 
On 4 September 2010 the Mw 7.1 Darfield earthquake occurred 10 km deep and ~35km 
west of Christchurch, New Zealand’s second largest city (pop. 390,3003). This was the first 
event in a sixteen-month sequence of earthquakes that trended eastwards across Christchurch, 
punctuated by a further three large events which caused significant additional damage 
(Bradley et al., 2014) . The second, and most damaging of these larger events occurred on 22 
February 2011, when the Mw 6.2 Christchurch Earthquake led to 185 deaths and more than 
6,500 injuries (Johnston et al., 2014). Originating 5 km under the city’s southern suburbs, 
only 6 kilometers away from the city’s central business district (CBD), unusually high 
vertical accelerations caused extensive liquefaction and associated ground and building 
damage (Chang et al., 2014). The Darfield earthquake had been coordinated at the regional 
level. The scale of the disaster caused by the Christchurch earthquake, and the magnitude of 
the required response and recovery operations, led to the declaration of the first state of 
national emergency in New Zealand, on the 23rd February 2011, which lasted until the 
activation of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) on the 1st May 2011 
                                                             
3 Estimated as at June 2010. Source: Subnational Population Estimates: At 30 June 2010. Statistics New Zealand. 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/. 
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(see Appendix 1 for a more detailed outline of this disaster’s impacts). A purpose-built 
central government agency of limited duration, CERA was tasked with managing the overall 
recovery strategy, and given a range of powers designed to reduce obstacles to recovery 
decision-making (Johnson & Mamula-Seadon, 2014). This article uses Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence (CES) when referring to the larger, cumulative earthquake disaster. It is 
largely focused, however, on the state of national emergency period that followed the 
Christchurch Earthquake. 
THE CES: SCIENCE COORDINATION 
The CES created a range of new science requirements and opportunities. Although 
mandated to coordinate research in response to both, the NHRP was newly formed and 
lacked detailed protocols for response coordination (NHRP, 2009b). As a result the 
development of the NHRP coordination effort over this period was largely organic, 
responding to developments in the wider environment. After the initial Darfield Earthquake 
local Christchurch scientists self-activated within hours, conducting assessments and 
gathering fault, seismic, liquefaction, building and infrastructure data across the city and 
surrounds. In support of the response, much of this activity was also for more basic research 
purposes (Quigley et al. 2012). Within days, it had developed into the series of broadly 
themed research operations that was to characterize the ongoing collaborative research effort 
coordinated by the NHRP during the CES (see Table A1, Appendix A). 
The response operation to the Darfield earthquake was coordinated at the regional level 
by the CDEM Group based in the Canterbury Regional Council (ECAN) (Johnson & 
Mamula-Seadon, 2014). For this reason, the wider research effort was loosely coordinated 
through daily NHRP briefing sessions also held at ECAN. Attended by representatives from 
the NHRP, member organisations, key research operations, response agencies and others, this 
forum provided updates concerning the previous day’s research and ongoing research 
priorities and issues; representatives were then able to brief others. Raising awareness across 
the wider research effort, these daily sessions provided a crucial channel of two-way 
communication, both within the post-disaster research collaboration and with responding 
agencies. 
The much greater devastation caused by the Mw 6.2 Christchurch earthquake on 22 
February 2011 prompted New Zealand’s first ever declaration of a state of national 
emergency, and – in a major deviation from existing MCDEM procedure – the co-location of 
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district, regional and national response levels of operation on site, run by the National 
Controller from a single Christchurch Response Center (CRC). Also for the first time, this 
operations center explicitly included a Science Liaison function (McLean et al. 2012). This 
function was managed by the NHRP, which also staffed the Science Desk that was centrally 
positioned in the CRC. Reflecting both the gains made after the Darfield earthquake, and the 
politicizing effect of this second, more destructive event, this explicit acknowledgement of 
the role of science in the response helped the NHRP cement the gains in end-user 
engagement made after the earlier event.  
As the organic development of the NHRP’s coordination role adapted to incorporate the 
new science liaison function, new challenges emerged. McLean et al. (2012) found that 
confusion arising out of the new structure, regional political tensions within the response 
operation, and a lack of appropriate information technology made communication difficult 
within the CRC. This meant many relied on face-to-face communication, which in turn 
required physically finding others located in the CRC (McLean et al., 2012). The NHRP’s 
ability to negotiate these issues was improved by its new location at the Science Desk, and by 
the NHRP manager’s participation at daily high-level CRC briefings. These gains were 
somewhat offset, however, by the speed with which the new science function was introduced, 
which meant there was no time to officially incorporate it into the modular CIMS structure, 
or add a science section to the Situation Report format informed by this structure (NCMC 
Log). The introduction of such a section would have improved the NHRP’s ability to 
communicate with the agencies involved in the response operation, since this was another 
significant channel of communication within the wider response operation (NCMC Log, 
McLean et al., 2012).  
A science section in the Situation Report would also have helped improve communication 
across the wider research operation coordinated by the NHRP. Although the engineering 
response operation held its own briefing sessions, as did some of the geotechnical research 
programs, the NHRP did not conduct daily research briefing sessions, as it had done after the 
Darfield Earthquake. This was largely due to the much greater scale and complexity of this 
second science effort. The loss of the wider daily science briefing session, however, removed 
the forum that, during the Darfield response, had fed into functional and structural NHRP 
decision-making, and informed response agencies, as well as raising awareness across 
disparate research programs. These communication issues were compounded by a structural 
issue, which arose out of the crossover between the new NHRP coordinating role, and the 
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more familiar advisory and support responsibilities of its host organization GNS Science 
(Buwalda et al., 2014). Assumptions as to the demarcation of tasks and responsibilities 
between the CRI and the larger consortium tended to default to GNS Science. Although the 
NHRP was officially responsible for science coordination, those representing this consortium 
were routinely understood by most agencies to be working for GNS Science, for example. 
Similarly, the Science Liaison desk was often described as the “GNS desk”. Later, this would 
be continued in an ongoing lack of reference to the NHRP in most official review documents, 
which like the NCMC Log, referred only to GNS Science in relation to science coordination 
in the CRC (e.g. Cooper et al., 2012; Mclean et al., 2012; OAG, 2012). This meant that the 
NHRP’s coordinating role remained largely behind the scenes. 
RESEARCH PARTICIPATION DECISIONS AFTER THE CHRISTCHURCH 
EARTHQUAKE 
A significant aspect of this role involved allocation of existing and additional research 
funding to earthquake-related projects. Allocation decisions made by the NHRP management 
group enabled a range of research activities that were not being directly coordinated by the 
NHRP, including engineering and geotechnical programs, and so extended the reach of its 
coordinating influence. The government provided an additional NZ$1 million in research 
funding after the Darfield earthquake, and a further NZ$3 million after the Christchurch 
earthquake (Berryman, 2012). Some of this was allocated retrospectively as reimbursement 
for projects initiated immediately after these events, particularly those in support of the 
response operation, as well as for major new research programs. Calls for proposals 
(including retrospective applications) made funding conditional, however, on a letter, or 
letters, proving endorsement of the relevant research project by an agency or organization 
involved in the response and recovery operations in Christchurch. This requirement clarified 
a fundamental NHRP expectation: that research into these events should integrate the needs 
of end-users, and so increase the uptake of research in policy decisions. In addition, it forced 
researchers to engage with agencies and organisations involved in the response, and so to this 
extent brought current and potential research activity to their attention, further opening the 
possibility of cross-sector collaboration.   
Decisions involving participation can also clarify less explicit underlying assumptions 
(Verweij et al., 2014). This NHRP agency endorsement requirement effectively excluded 
researchers disinclined or unable to engage with response agencies from these funding 
rounds. Existing hazard and disaster researchers and teams were most able to fulfill the 
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requirement, since they were likely to have already developed links with agencies and other 
researchers in this field. To some extent this reflected the original NHRP focus on the 
maintenance of existing hazard and disaster research capacity. Although this was represented, 
at that time, by member organizations, it is clear that the NHRP’s coordinating role extended 
well beyond research activities involving these organisations. International research teams 
contributing to this collaborative effort after both events included researchers from 
organisations such as Geotechnical Extreme Events Reconnaissance (GEER), the Earthquake 
Engineering Research Institute (EERI) and the Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake 
Engineering (TCLEE), a branch of the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). In 
addition, research funding decisions brought other local and national research providers into 
the larger coordinated science effort, including Lincoln, Victoria and Otago Universities, as 
well as a range of private geological and geotechnical science providers. This did not lead, 
however, to the expansion of NHRP membership in response to the new opportunities 
generated by the earthquakes (Buwalda et al., 2014). 
The second implicit assumption that constrained the NHRP’s coordinating role concerned 
scope. Most of those involved understood that the scope of this role did not extend beyond 
the larger research effort funded and/or coordinated by the consortium. This assumption was 
shared well beyond those directly or indirectly involved with the NHRP. It was likely to have 
been informed on the one hand by widespread respect for research autonomy, and on the 
other, by the urgent, larger focus on response-related activities. 
In addition to the large, loosely networked research collaboration with agencies 
coordinated by the NHRP, however, the CES also attracted the attention of local and national 
researchers with little or no prior engagement in the field, and of international researchers 
excited by the research opportunities offered by these events. The pronounced geotechnical 
impacts of these earthquakes in a city where development had been required to meet high-
seismic building codes made these opportunities particularly attractive to hazard and disaster 
researchers. That this disaster zone was in a developed, English speaking nation with a well-
networked research community may also have increased its appeal as a research destination. 
By the time the Christchurch Earthquake occurred, international research interest generated 
in the wake of the Darfield event was already well in excess of the hosting, collaborative 
capacity of New Zealand researchers who were engaged with the response.  
The high profile generated by the more destructive Christchurch earthquake appeared to 
immediately escalate this research interest. Senior local researchers were contacted within a 
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day of this event by a number of international research teams seeking to arrange new data 
gathering visits within weeks. Consulted at that point, NHRP management confirmed that all 
science conducted in the region came under the aegis of the state of national emergency, and 
that for this reason the issue of research pressure on impacted communities was being 
discussed with the National Controller. Over the following week several senior CDEM 
personnel independently asked the National Controller to clarify the issue of international 
researcher visits, after persistent requests for research access from international researchers 
reluctant to accept advice, from these staff, to wait until the response period was over 
(NCMC Log). The National Controller consulted with other CDEM personnel, the 
international desk in the CRC, and the NHRP. During the same period, increasing numbers of 
uninvited international researchers were arriving daily at the CRC. Requesting support from 
the response to access CBD, most were interested in liquefaction and building structural 
performance data. The volume of these visitors caused problems not just for staff in the CRC, 
but also for those engineers and others already engaged in research projects in collaboration 
with the response (Social Science Situation Report 2011; McLean et al., 2012). By Monday 7 
March, almost two weeks after the Christchurch earthquake, visiting researcher numbers had 
reached 100 per day, forcing the introduction of a new CRC access protocol designed to 
restrict their entry (Engineering Situation Report 2011). It should be noted that these numbers 
refer only to those researchers who made contact with the CRC; overall visiting researcher 
numbers are likely to have been much higher. 
RESEARCH PARTICIPATION AND THE (SOCIAL SCIENCE) MORATORIUM 
DIRECTIVE  
On the same day, the National Controller’s consultation over this issue culminated in a 
directive, issued under the state of emergency, requiring that all international researchers 
should postpone data-gathering visits to the city until the state of national emergency was 
lifted, or until 1 May, whichever came earlier (NCMC Log). Social scientists, in particular, 
were to be held off until 1 of May. MCDEM did not have the resources required to host 
visiting researchers while engaged in the response, and the consensus opinion was that local 
communities should be given space before being interviewed by researchers. Geoscience and 
engineering fact-finding missions that did not include a community focus were to be the 
exception, as long as they were coordinated through NHRP, and so contributed to the science 
response (NCMC Log).  
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This directive was necessary, in order to address the escalation of research interest in the 
days after the earthquake. It was made by the National Controller, using the powers available 
to him under the state of national emergency, and informed by networking and advice from 
within the New Zealand hazard and disaster research community, NHRP management, and 
within MCDEM. The directive was not, however, officially formulated, widely promulgated, 
or accessible on any official websites. It was communicated by the National Controller’s 
office to CDEM and other response personnel through the Coordinated Incident Management 
Structure (CIMS) structure. It did not feature prominently in the situation reports, which were 
an important communication mechanism within the wider response operation. This meant 
that although it was discussed with the international desk in the CRC (NCMC Log), it was 
not as widely disseminated as it could have been within the wider response operation.  
The decision was also communicated informally to NHRP management. Those staffing 
the science desk were responsible for explaining the directive to visiting researchers arriving 
at the CRC. In hindsight, it is likely that the difficulties of this task would have been reduced 
if it had been possible to refer visiting researchers to an officially worded and authorised 
version of the directive, on a relevant government website. NHRP researchers were also 
required to disseminate this directive through local and international hazard and disaster 
networks. There was no obvious mechanism for communicating the moratorium decision to 
local and international hazard and disaster scientific communities, however, and even less 
possibility of reaching the rapidly burgeoning local research community inspired by the 
earthquake to enter the hazard and disaster field for the first time. The moratorium decision 
was made early after the Christchurch earthquake, a day or so before contact and 
collaboration was established between the NHRP and the office of the Chief Science Adviser 
(CSA), with a view to demarcating science communication tasks (NCMC log). Since a large 
part of this role is science communication with the public (Gluckman 2014), the CSA might 
have been well placed to help publicize both the moratorium directive, and the rationale 
behind it. 
Later in March, local education organisations concerned about international research 
pressure contacted the University of Canterbury, and were informed about the moratorium 
directive by university management. Information about the moratorium was subsequently 
made available to pre-school, primary and secondary schools through the Ministry of 
Education. The NHRP collaborated with this Ministry to provide ethical guidelines for 
research conducted with education organisations after the moratorium was lifted, which 
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included requiring all such research to have applied for and received ethics approval, and that 
all projects be registered with the Ministry.  
Under the state of national emergency, the National Controller was authorized to exercise 
powers of compulsion. The moratorium directive was voluntary, however, as far as members 
of the science community were concerned. As a directive, its primary force was in requiring 
responding agencies and researchers involved in the collaboration with the response to 
decline requests for access and assistance from visiting researchers who were not 
contributing to that collaboration. International media crews wishing to document the 
activities of international researchers were also declined access (Social Science Situation 
Report 2011). Note that although the directive applied to research activity in the Greater 
Christchurch region after the earthquake, it was only possible to deny access to the cordoned 
off CBD. While all visiting researchers attempting to engage with this local collaboration 
were asked to respect the directive, there was no way to ensure that they did so. There was 
also no way to communicate the directive to visiting researchers that did not attempt to 
contact local research and response operations, or indeed, to assess numbers of visiting 
researchers overall; as a proportion of overall research activity in the city at the time, those 
that did make contact indicated that these numbers were very high. 
Those made aware of the moratorium by were largely supportive, although some 
researchers were reluctant to accept the authority of the National Controller in this domain, or 
the rationale for his decision, or both.  
ANALYSIS 
The NHRP’s ability to coordinate the larger research effort in collaboration with the 
response was constrained by several factors. The initial parameters evidenced in the contract 
and strategy documents created a focus on existing capacity, and failed to distinguish clearly 
between the roles of the larger consortium and its member organizations during emergency 
responses. The NHRP had not had time to develop when the CES began. It was trialing a new 
consortium approach to research funding and coordination, and so had no precedent to 
follow.  Despite these constraints, the NHRP played a significant role in the production of a 
coordinated range of scientific outputs of high quality (Buwalda et al., 2014), many of which 
fed directly into policy and practice decisions (Table A1). The inclusion of a new science 
liaison function in the CRC, like the provision for the NHRP to coordinate emergency 
research support in future events in the new, draft CDEM plan (MCDEM, 2014) testified to 
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the new levels of collaboration with agencies achieved during and after these earthquakes. As 
a pilot consortium, despite significant constraints, the NHRP demonstrated that it is possible 
to bring a large section of the hazard and disaster research community into collaboration with 
the response operation. It also established that such consortiums have the potential to 
coordinate research activity after major disaster events in such a way as to increase the 
uptake of research opportunities, including the opportunity to engage end-users, and the 
provision of scientific evidence as the basis of decision-making, while also decreasing the 
risks to science quality documented after other disasters.  
On-going decision-making about the structural, functional, geographic and participatory 
boundaries of collaborations of this kind have been found to create new issues as the 
collaboration unfolds (Verweij et al., 2014). Looking more closely at boundary decisions 
concerning the larger collaboration between the response operation and the NHRP helps to 
clarify some of the issues arising out of the management of research activity after disasters. 
Many of these issues are best illustrated by the moratorium directive, which can be seen as a 
flash point. Driven by rapid developments after the disaster, this directive was the result of 
assumptions and swift decision-making concerning the distribution of tasks between the 
response operation and NHRP, the scope of NHRP function and responsibility, and 
participation in research activity into the disaster and its impacts. The directive is also 
important because it indexes the research pressure that Birkland and others have identified as 
a secondary effect of the high profile generated by major disasters (Birkland 2009, Rodriquez 
et al., 2007, Citraningtyas et al., 2010; Brown & Donini, 2014; Gill et al., 2007). In addition 
to (scientific) risks to research quality, this pressure carries more immediate risks of 
particular concern to the response operation. As in the CRC, the volume of arriving 
researchers can compromise the ability of such operations – already overwhelmed by the 
disaster – to provide basic services to the impacted population. As well, the convergence of 
researchers into a disaster zone collectively risks creating a cumulative research burden on 
already stressed, impacted communities disproportionate to any benefits they may gain, in 
contravention of the Belmont Report’s (1979) distributive justice principle (Brown & Donini, 
2014; Sumathipala et al., 2010; Citraningtyas et al., 2010). These immediate risks meant that 
the rapid escalation of research pressure after the Christchurch earthquake required active 
management, and rapid decision-making. Since it is a consequence of major disasters, this 
kind of increase in research activity will always require some form of active management if 
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these risks are to be addressed (Brown & Donini, 2014; Walton-Ellery & Rashid 2012; Gill et 
al, 2007).  
THE MORATORIUM DIRECTIVE, VISITING RESEARCHERS AND SOCIAL 
SCIENTISTS 
As a necessary intervention designed to reduce these risks after the Christchurch 
Earthquake, however, the moratorium directive introduced a new research participation 
restriction that affected research activity in the impacted region. This restriction also marked 
a participation boundary in the larger collaboration between the response operation and 
activities coordinated by the NHRP. Participation boundary decisions of this kind carry the 
risk of creating the perception that the interests of a particular group have been ignored 
(Verweij et al., 2014). It has been well established that such perceptions risk bringing the 
legitimacy of the relevant collaborative activity into question, and so can put the larger 
collaborative enterprise at risk (Cash et al., 2003; McNie, 2007; Parker & Crona, 2012). 
Possibly due to sensitivity around these and other issues, the moratorium directive was 
not officially formulated, or promulgated through the media. The speed with which this 
decision was forced by rapidly unfolding developments in the high-pressure post-disaster 
environment is also likely to be a factor here. As entered in the NCMC log, the National 
Controller’s directive allowed only visiting researchers who joined programs coordinated by 
the NHRP to engage in research activity in the Greater Christchurch region, which was 
directly impacted by the disaster. This was in effect already the case. The vast majority of 
researchers arriving at the CRC were geotechnical and structural engineers, who were being 
declined access to red zones and support from the response and/or other researchers unless 
required by existing collaborative research projects. Overall, far more visiting engineers 
requested and were declined research access during this period than visiting social scientists. 
However because this log entry also specified holding off social scientists in particular, and 
because there was no official formulation to refer to, the directive was widely perceived and 
described as the social science moratorium. While the bluntness of this description was 
effective in reducing immediate pressure on impacted populations, it was not strictly 
accurate. All visiting researchers not involved in local collaborations were subject to the 
directive, irrespective of discipline. And many agencies were conducting or engaging with 
social science initiatives that were gathering data to inform response decision-making; most, 
although not all, did not involve direct contact with impacted communities (such as statistical 
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studies of existing data streams, literature searches and modeling of likely demographic 
effects, for example).  
Restricting research contact with impacted populations during disaster response after 
disasters will always carry the risk of alienating the sectors of the research community that 
rely on such contact. In retrospect, however, phrasing this directive as a social science 
moratorium exacerbated this risk, by appearing to exclude an entire branch of science. To the 
extent that this indicated that the requirements of this section of the research community were 
not being considered, it also risked compromising the legitimacy of the larger collaboration. 
In hindsight, it is likely that these risks could have been reduced if this directive had been 
expressed as a collaboration requirement, in terms of its rationale (limiting the research 
burden on impacted populations) and effect (facilitating access to all researchers involved in 
the larger research effort being coordinated in collaboration with the response effort). This 
phrasing would still have required responders and researchers to refuse access to visiting 
researchers not required by this effort, but without appearing to single out social science. 
Phrasing the directive in terms of participation, rather than exclusion, would also have 
directed interested researchers to participation options, while clarifying the rationale would 
have been likely to have increased perceptions of the legitimacy of the coordinated research 
effort (Cash et al., 2003; McNie, 2007; Parker & Crona, 2012). 
STRUCTURAL BOUNDARY DECISIONS (AND THE SCIENCE/POLICY INTERFACE)  
Senior researchers and CDEM staff had requested clear direction from the National 
Controller concerning visiting international researchers. Such a directive was only possible 
under the powers granted to this office under the state of national emergency. Lending the 
authority of that office to a directive of this kind had other advantages. Making it easier for 
responders to decline access to visiting researchers, this authority also to some extent 
shielded local and national researchers from negative fall-out from sectors of the research 
community following the directive. A significant disadvantage, however, was that the 
directive was in effect a participation decision that directly affected the interests of the 
research community, and it appeared to have been made only by senior emergency managers 
(and so a government agency).  
Effectively placing a moratorium on all research activity not part of this collaborative 
effort, this government directive risked alienating newly interested members of the local New 
Zealand research community, as well as sectors of national and international hazard and 
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disaster research communities. Again, in hindsight this risk might have been better managed 
with a joint directive, issued officially by the National Controller and the NHRP, making 
research activity conditional on collaboration with the response and specifying minimal 
contact with impacted populations. Direct responsibility for this directive, even when shared 
with this much more powerful entity, may have increased the exposure of the NHRP and 
member organisations to fall-out from research communities. But as a large research 
consortium, including several major national universities and Crown Research Institutes, the 
NHRP had the potential to spread this risk across institutions, and in this way reduce it. The 
official involvement of the NHRP as an equal partner in the moratorium decision would have 
clarified the breadth of support for the collaboration requirement across New Zealand 
research organisations. Ensuring that government agencies were not perceived to be making 
uninformed political decisions about research participation, this kind of joint directive would 
also have demonstrated that the research collaboration with the response coordinated by the 
NHRP reached to the highest levels. These potential benefits would have been greater, 
however, if the NHRP had been free to move rapidly to include new member organisations, 
and had also been more able to generate a much higher, more official profile over this period, 
both generally, and as distinct from GNS science in particular.  
As a CDEM directive, the moratorium decision also clarified structural assumptions at 
the time concerning the distribution of responsibility for research activity in the disaster zone. 
Within hazard and disaster research networks, and across responding agencies, the NHRP 
was understood to be responsible for – and largely limited to – coordinating activities either 
actively driven and/or funded through this consortium. Research activity outside this larger 
collaboration thus fell under the aegis of the response, along with other activities in the 
disaster zone. Reflecting cultural expectations concerning research autonomy, these 
assumptions were also informed by the urgency and magnitude of the task facing the 
response, which tended to narrow the focus of all concerned onto the collaborative effort. 
They were in any case implicit in the consortium’s initial parameters: the NHRP was set up 
to sustain and increase existing hazard and disaster networks, and so national capacity, not to 
actively manage the larger surge in research interest and activity that follows major disasters.  
Newly interested local researchers, however, did not always share these assumptions. 
While private providers of psychosocial support to businesses and other organisations were in 
demand after the disaster, for example, those that attempted to ensure their activities were 
coordinated with and contributed to the larger response effort were unsuccessful (pers. com. 
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J. Black, organisational psychologist). There were other instances in which local researchers, 
upon hearing of the NHRP, assumed this consortium was responsible for immediately acting 
to engage all local scientists interested in research after the disaster (many of these 
subsequently contributed to the research effort coordinated and funded by the NHRP). While 
opportunism is a factor in increased local research interest after disasters (Rodriguez et al., 
2007, Birkland, 2009), the desire to contribute research skills and time to the response and to 
the local community is at least as significant a motivating factor. As well as marking another 
instance of perceived exclusion, then, the initial disappointment created by mismatched 
assumptions about the scope of the NHRP’s role underlines the peculiar relevance research 
into a disaster event carries for those researchers living in the impacted region. This issue 
arises out of the intersection of the boundaries defining the participatory and geographical 
extent of the coordinated post-disaster research effort. Although a factor in NHRP research 
participation and funding decisions, it remained implicit, and did not appear in calls for 
research proposals, or other NHRP documents.  
TRANSPARENCY AND COMMUNICATION (AND THE SCIENCE/COMMUNITY 
INTERFACE) 
Two broad themes can be seen running through the issues that arose out of decisions 
involving the geographical, functional, structural and participatory boundaries of the post-
disaster research effort coordinated by the NHRP. Firstly, these issues all involved risks 
arising out of the perception that individuals or groups were being unfairly excluded by the 
relevant boundary decisions, which in turn posed risks to the legitimacy of the wider research 
effort. Secondly, these risks were all highlighted and exacerbated by communication and 
awareness issues. Difficulties formulating and promulgating the moratorium directive, for 
example, led to poor dissemination and impact with possible alienation of some research 
groups. Since the consultation process informing this and other decision-making remained 
behind the scenes, like the wider networks that informed NHRP activity, the directive was 
open to being misinterpreted as a government intervention that curtailed academic freedoms, 
while NHRP activity risked being misconstrued as that of a single member agency. And 
finally, misunderstandings about the scope of the NHRP’s coordinating role contributed to 
feelings of disappointment and unfair exclusion in sectors of the wider research community 
living in the disaster zone 
It follows that if communication issues and lack of awareness exacerbated these issues, 
improvements in these areas are likely to mitigate them. It has been established in the wider 
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literature concerning complex cross-sector collaborations in high pressure environments that 
both communication and transparency contribute to perceptions of legitimate process, even 
among groups who have been excluded (Cash et al., 2003; McNie, 2007; Cummings & 
Kiesler, 2007; Parker & Crona, 2012). Measures to improve the transparency of research 
coordination processes, and that of collaborative engagements with the response operation 
would have increased awareness of the NHRP’s role, and significantly diminished confusion 
around decision-making criteria for research funding and participation. Formalizing this 
information, and providing it in an accessible format on an open platform from the outset 
may have made the subsequent moratorium directive unnecessary. By diminishing the 
associated risk of alienating sectors of the research community, this would also have limited 
potential compromise to the legitimacy of the wider collaborative operation.  
The widespread dissemination of decision-making criteria for research participation is 
arguably even more important when it comes to addressing the risks research pressure can 
pose to the response operation, and impacted populations. In the first instance, observance of 
the moratorium relied on dissemination to relevant researchers, who were more likely to 
adhere to it if the rationales for decisions made concerning research participation, and the 
exclusion of a proportion of interested researchers were clearly articulated.  
No matter how widely voluntary measures are disseminated to researchers, however, 
there will always be those disinclined, for a variety of reasons, to accept the criteria for 
participation, and correspondingly reluctant to refrain from activity that does not meet those 
criteria. For this reason directives like that issued after the Christchurch Earthquake need to 
be communicated to those groups most likely to come under direct pressure as a result of 
increased research activity. Researchers, and the organisations they represent, can wield 
considerable authority. During the CES, a number of individuals and agencies sought 
clarification from local researchers, research organisations and the NHRP after being 
contacted by international researchers. Many were unaware not only of the moratorium 
directive, but also of their rights to refuse to consent to research participation detailed in the 
Belmont Report (1979). Concerns expressed included the expectation that research 
participation might be required of them, or of vulnerable populations in their charge, stress at 
the prospect of refusing researcher requests, and anxiety about the repercussions of refusals. 
These groups welcomed the moratorium directive, as it empowered agencies, researchers and 
potential research participants who so wished to decline requests from interested researchers.  
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The empowering effect of this directive was only available, however, to those potential 
research participants who were aware of it. To effectively reduce the risk of research pressure 
exacerbating the other stressors affecting impacted populations, research participation criteria 
and the participant rights provided in the Belmont Report need to be as widely disseminated 
as possible, through a variety of public channels. Given that some regions were without 
power for a considerable period, these channels should always include communication 
measures that do not rely on electricity, like door knocking and leaflet drops, which McLean 
et al. (2012) found to have been an effective means of communication after the Christchurch 
Earthquake. At the other end of the spectrum, including interactive and crowd-sourcing 
platforms wherever possible would allow generation of wider debate about the issue. 
Allowing those feeling pressured by research participation requests to contribute to and seek 
clarification from those coordinating research activities in the disaster zone, such platforms 
would also provide pathways for those wishing to take part in research activities (as either 
researchers or participants). Conversely, interactive data from agencies, researchers and 
potential and actual participants would also have the potential to help clarify the extent and 
nature of research activity in the impacted region, making it possible to develop new 
management measures in response to this developing picture.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following broad recommendations for research coordination during and after 
disasters can be extrapolated from this analysis. 
EXISTING/CONTINUING RESEARCH CONSORTIUM:  
Research coordination after hazard events will be most effective if it is conducted by a 
permanent research consortium, with existing, closely related business as usual research 
coordination functions which facilitate the ongoing development of relevant national research 
and end-user networks, and of networking skills. If such a consortium is not already in place, 
establishing it should be the first step.  
RECOMMENDATIONS BEFORE DISASTERS: 
Planning: The research consortium responsible for post-disaster research coordination 
should work with agencies responsible for emergency management to develop a detailed, 
collaborative disaster research coordination plan. The research plan should be fully integrated 
into the relevant response management structure. Resources should be allocated to research 
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management activities. The research consortium should made explicitly responsible for a 
distinct science function in the response structure, and provision should be made requiring 
consortium representatives to engage in regular emergency response training at local, 
regional and national levels with response agencies and other relevant organisations.  
The research coordination plan should make provision for measures designed to facilitate 
a focus on - and the coordination of - as much research activity as possible in the relevant 
impacted region after hazard events. The aim should be to anticipate and plan to manage a 
surge in research interest that is roughly parallel to the profile of the relevant hazard event. 
Objectives should include mitigating the risks posed by this increased research activity, while 
also taking advantage of the possibilities it offers in terms of contribution to the wider effort, 
and the development of local research capacity and international research networks.  
RECOMMENDATIONS AFTER DISASTERS: 
Integration With Response: Research coordination should be fully integrated with, and 
conducted in collaboration with the response operation.  
Proactive Communication: As soon as possible after the event those responsible for 
research and emergency management should issue joint statements detailing research 
coordination responsibilities, processes, participation pathways, research participant rights (to 
require proof of ethics approval, and to refuse consent) and measures to mitigate the risks 
associated with research pressure (such as collaboration and/or registration requirements). 
These statements should be officially formulated, and provide clear, accessibly phrased 
information. Relevant agencies should be included in ensuring that this information is as 
widely promulgated as possible – available on relevant open access websites, and included in 
media releases, leaflet drops, public meetings, interactive platforms and other communication 
channels used by the response operation.  
Transparency: If possible, all research coordination decisions should be accessible on an 
up to date, monitored and appropriately resourced open website. Material provided should 
continue to include all broad decisions about research participation and the demarcation of 
tasks as they are made, as well as more specific information including research funding 
decisions, and relevant current and completed research projects and outputs in the impacted 
region.  
Monitoring: All information gathered (from interactive websites, registration 
requirements, and agencies as well as through research funding decisions) should be used to 
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monitor the wider research effort, with a view to responding to evolving research trends in 
order to maintain research quality, respond to emerging requirements and opportunities, and 
mitigate the risks associated with research pressure. 
Building Local Capacity: Consideration should be given to involving highly qualified 
researchers from the impacted region with new interest in the hazard and disaster field, as 
much as possible, in order to develop local and national research capacity by bringing in new 
expertise.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The Sendai Framework (UNISDR 2015) has called for government organisations and 
increased coordination of disaster risk reduction, including support for the policy/science 
interface for decision-making. Research activity after the Christchurch earthquake bears out 
this call, as well as findings from other disasters concerning the convergence of researchers 
into the disaster zone, and significant escalation of research activity. Within this increase in 
overall research activity, research needs and opportunities were revealed in this post-disaster 
environment to be in tension with the risks posed to research quality by this increase, and to 
local agencies and populations. Active management of these tensions was necessary in order 
to address needs and maximize opportunities, while also reducing negative impacts on the 
larger response operation, local populations and research quality. However such management 
necessarily involved decisions about participation in research activity, which carried 
secondary risks associated with perceptions that groups had been excluded from 
participation. When not addressed, such perceptions have the potential to significantly 
compromise the legitimacy and the longer term validity of the larger research enterprise, and 
so can threaten gains made when it comes to addressing research needs and taking up 
opportunities created by the disaster. This allows us to conclude with five broad points about 
research coordination after disasters – all follow from the larger contention that such 
coordination is necessary. 
In the first instance, research organisations are unlikely to be able to coordinate research 
activity in disaster zones without the involvement of disaster response agencies and 
organisations. This involvement is critical in order to address the research needs created by 
the disaster effectively, which often requires the engagement of these end-users. It is also 
required to minimize negative impacts of research activity on the wider response operation, 
and to facilitate researcher access to disaster zones. Conversely, response agencies are neither 
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sufficiently qualified nor networked to effectively manage post-disaster research activity 
without support from the research community. To the extent that they are perceived to be 
doing so, they risk creating the perception that decision-making has ignored scientific 
considerations, and that the scientific community has been excluded from contributing to 
decisions that affect it directly. The first point, then, is that the risks and opportunities 
associated with post-disaster research activity can only be managed effectively to the extent 
that they are jointly managed, through as full and equal a collaboration as possible between 
the response operation and research communities.  
This kind of joint, collaborative management of research activity will rely in turn, 
however, on the range and relevance of the networks represented by both response and 
research operations, and which are thereby able to feed into decision-making in the chaotic 
and high pressure post-disaster environment. The New Zealand CIMS system is a purpose-
built project management structure designed to effect this after disaster events by bringing 
together (and connecting back into) relevant government and other networks, at local, 
regional and national levels. The NHRP was barely established when this disaster struck. The 
extent to which it was able to organically develop a similar representative and networking 
function relied heavily on its ability as a national consortium to represent the research 
organisations demonstrating the greatest collective existing hazard and disaster research 
capacity at the time of the CES. Although not prepared for the post-disaster environment, the 
NHRP structure made it possible to bring this range of organisations together to effect 
collective decision-making about the coordination of research activity, by linking back 
through them into wider hazard and disaster research networks. Thus the second broad point 
we can draw from the Christchurch experience concerns the advantages of using a research 
consortium or platform structure to coordinate research activity after disasters. The more 
such a consortium draws on and represents the interests of wider research communities, the 
greater its capacity to ensure high quality research outcomes, and the less likely it is to create 
the perception that the interests of particular groups or organisations are being excluded as a 
result of decision-making about participation.  
Thirdly, the corollary of this logic can be applied to the scope of research coordination 
after disasters. The wider this scope is, the less likely it is to generate perceptions of 
exclusion, even when a significant proportion of researchers wishing to participate are not 
able to do so. Including all research activity in the impacted region would also increase the 
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possibility of monitoring the amount and nature of research activity in the impacted region, 
and so of managing it effectively.  
The fourth point concerns the profile of the coordinating research consortium. The NHRP 
management group included internationally networked senior scientists who represented – 
and relied on – expertise from all six member organisations. This group was responsible for 
all major NHRP decision-making concerning the coordination of research activity during and 
after the CES, including structural decisions about the demarcation of tasks and 
responsibilities, functional decisions concerning the scope and nature of research programs, 
and broad participatory decisions concerning engagement in research into this disaster and its 
aftermath. The extent to which collaborative research activity after the Christchurch 
Earthquake was informed by this larger decision-making body remained behind the scenes, 
however, due to the widespread collective assumption that attributed NHRP activity to GNS 
science. This attribution significantly limited the consortium’s ability to demonstrate the 
extent to which it in fact represented and was informed by the wider New Zealand (and 
international) hazard and disaster research community. To the extent that it increased the 
perception that a single organization was making decisions that influenced a range of sectors 
and organisations, it risked creating the impression that some of those directly affected by 
these decisions were excluded from both research management decision-making, and 
participation in research activities. The fourth point that emerges from the Christchurch 
earthquake experience relates to the extent to which research coordination arrangements are 
widely disseminated, transparent, and understood to at least some degree by all involved.  
The fifth point to be drawn from the experience of research engagement after the 
Christchurch earthquake comes back again to the situation of the NHRP at the onset of the 
CES. Barely established, this consortium had not had time to develop extensive research 
networks, or generate a profile among researcher and end-user communities. As a pilot 
platform, it had no precedent to follow; with no resourcing for management, and without 
protocols and guidelines concerning coordinating research activity after disaster events, the 
NHRP was forced to evolve organically in response to this challenging environment. This 
situation can also be used, however, to make the obvious reverse point. Consortium status, 
collaborative decision-making relationships and structures, and links into wider networks 
were already in place when the NHRP was required to respond to this disaster event. There is 
no doubt this played a major part in this consortium’s considerable achievements after the 
disaster, which relied heavily on its ability to bring a wide range of expertise into decision-
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making around research coordination and into research programs and activities. It was also a 
major factor in the NHRP’s ability to network across agencies at local and national levels to 
coordinate this research effort in collaboration with the response operation. The fifth point, 
then, which we can draw from the coordination of research during and after the CES, builds 
on the second. The advantages of using a consortium or platform structure to coordinate such 
research activity, in other words, will be significantly increased if this is an existing, well-
established structure, with a relevant permanent research coordination function. The extent to 
which such a structure is able to fulfill its research coordination potential after disasters is 
likely to rely on the extent to which it is already engaged in the collaborative relationships – 
both within research communities, and with agencies and other relevant organisations – that 
become so crucial after disasters.  
Finally, it is important to end by reiterating the point that has already been made in 
relation to other disasters, concerning the intense research pressure that follows such events, 
and the effects of this pressure on local research and emergency management communities, 
and on impacted populations. This pressure was considerable and difficult to manage after 
the Christchurch Earthquake, which, although a major disaster by New Zealand standards, 
was not a catastrophic event. After a catastrophic disaster, requesting that ambitious, senior 
researchers from prestigious institutions and organisations respect the need to defer data 
gathering visits becomes an infinitely more demanding task, and this level of difficulty 
increases exponentially again for researchers and response agencies in developing countries, 
due to North/South power relations (Sumathipala et al., 2010; Brown & Donini 2014; 
Citraningtyas et al., 2010). Increased awareness and discussion of this issue among hazard 
and disaster research communities is essential to ensure that visiting research teams respect 
moral and ethical research principles, and recognize the importance of being guided by the 
needs of local response operations, researchers and impacted populations when conducting 
research after disasters.  
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APPENDIX A 
 SUMMARY OF THE 2010-2011 CANTERBURY EARTHQUAKE SEQUENCE 
(CES) 
On 4 September 2010 the Mw 7.1 Darfield earthquake occurred as a result of a fault 
rupture 10 km deep and ~35km west of Christchurch, New Zealand’s second largest city 
(pop. 390,3004). Ground shaking resulted in widespread liquefaction in eastern Christchurch, 
and caused ground, building and infrastructure damage (Cubrinovski et al. 2010; Bradley et 
al. 2014). This was the first event in a sixteen-month sequence of earthquakes that trended 
eastwards across Christchurch, punctuated by a further three large events which caused 
significant additional damage (Bradley et al., 2014) . The second, and most damaging of 
these larger events occurred on 22 February 2011, when the Mw 6.2 Christchurch Earthquake 
led to 185 deaths and more than 6,500 injuries (Johnston et al., 2014). Originating 5 km 
under the city’s southern suburbs, only 6 kilometers away from the city’s central business 
district (CBD), unusually high vertical accelerations caused extensive liquefaction and 
associated ground and building damage (Chang et al., 2014). Partial or total building collapse 
during this event caused 175 of the 185 deaths; 133 resulted from the collapse of two large 
multi-story buildings in the CBD (Cooper et al., 2012). The Darfield earthquake had been 
coordinated at the regional level. The scale of the disaster caused by the Christchurch 
earthquake, and the magnitude of the required response and recovery operations, led to the 
declaration of the first state of national emergency in New Zealand, on the 23rd February 
2011. Granting the National Controller “all the powers that are reasonably necessary or 
expedient” to enable the performance of his functions (Section 9[1], CDEM Act, 2002), the 
state of national emergency lasted until the activation of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery 
Authority (CERA) on the 1st May 2011. A purpose-built central government agency of 
limited duration, CERA was tasked with managing the overall recovery strategy, and given a 
range of powers designed to reduce obstacles to recovery decision-making (Johnson & 
Mamula-Seadon, 2014). The third and fourth of the larger events, on 13th June (Mw 6.0) and 
23rd December 2011 (Mw 5.9), respectively, were less disruptive, although they significantly 
compounded liquefaction and damage effects (Bradley et al., 2014; King et al., 2014). This 
article uses Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) when referring to the larger, cumulative 
                                                             
4 Estimated as at June 2010. Source: Subnational Population Estimates: At 30 June 2010. Statistics New Zealand. 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/. 
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earthquake disaster. It is largely focused, however, on the state of national emergency period 
that followed the Christchurch Earthquake. 
Damage to older buildings and facades in the CBD after the Darfield earthquake 
informed the decision to cordon off a significant proportion of the city center for safety 
reasons for a week, from 4-10 September (Chang et al., 2014). After the 2011 Christchurch 
earthquake, damage to the ~2,000 commercial buildings in the CBD was so extensive that the 
entire 349 hectare district was cordoned off as a ‘red zone’ (Chang et al. 2014). Although 
progressively reduced in size, a substantial cordon manned by the NZ Defence Force 
remained in place for more than two years, from 22/2/2011 to 30/6/2013 (Chang et al., 2014; 
McGregor, 2013.) More than half the commercial buildings in the CBD have been 
demolished, including a significant proportion of the city’s heritage buildings (Cooper, Carter 
& Fenwick, 2013; Chang et al., 2014). A large majority of residential buildings also sustained 
damage, as evidenced in more than 500,000 residential insurance claims for earthquake 
damage to buildings, land and contents from approximately 160,000 dwellings, as well as 
30,0000 non-residential insurance claims (King et al., 2014).  
The dominant cause of building damage was widespread liquefaction ground damage 
throughout central and eastern suburbs, particularly in the Christchurch earthquake 
(Cubrinovski et al., 2011; Bradley et al. 2014). Liquefaction also caused severe damage and 
disruption to road networks and aging, buried infrastructure networks, compromising water, 
electricity and sewage systems (Rogers et al., 2014; van Ballegooy et al., 2014). The extent 
and range of land damage caused by liquefaction and slope instability in some areas of the 
city was such that in 2011 the decision was made to categorize over 7,500 residential 
properties (~5% of total housing stock) as too difficult, uneconomic, dangerous and/or 
impractical to repair (Chang et al. 2014; Rogers et al., 2014). Those with properties zoned red 
on this basis were able to engage with a Government offer process, which provided eligible 
homeowners in these zones with the opportunity to relocate (Rogers et al. 2014). 
The total cost of recovery and reconstruction has been estimated at as much as NZ$40 
billion, which is equivalent to around 19% of New Zealand’s GDP (New Zealand Treasury 
2013; Stevenson et al., 2014). 
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Table B1: Broad categories of CES-related research activity coordinated through the NHRP 
 
APPENDIX B 
Geological sciences Aerial photography and LIDAR; ground 
penetrating radar (GPR); landslide/rockfall 
data;  
seismic fault trace data;  
aftershock shaking data 
Establishing uplift and subsidence; modelling seismic stress re-
distribution, aftershock forecasting, 
mapping the fault trace; identification of other seismic features; 
quantifying contributions to seismic hazard, stochastic ground 
motion simulation of Chch Earthquakes, mapping seismic faulting in 
the region; dynamic updates of state of current knowledge to inform 
agencies and the industry 
UC, GNS, VUW, (NZ) & 
international research partners End-users included:  
 
CDEM, CERA, OPMSA, TEC, 
MoE, MSD, CCC, WDC, SDC, 
ECAN, EQC, DBH/EAG;  
 
Also: Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu; 
Aecom; small & medium 




Research informed:  
 
response & recovery decision-
making;  
 
land use and other planning 
decisions including land zoning 
legislation;  
 
changes to building codes and 
practices;  
 
(2012) Royal Commission of 
Inquiry into Building Failure 
Caused by the Canterbury 
Earthquakes. 
Social Sciences Immediate and medium term social, 
demographic and economic impacts;  
Disaster risk and resilience data. 
Research advice and assessments:  psycho-social support regimes 
and information provision for individuals, staff, organizations and 
communities impacted by the earthquakes; socio-economic impacts 
of the earthquake on urban and rural businesses and communities; 
disaster resilience, community resilience and recovery monitoring; 
predictions of population and capital ‘flight’, and other short/medium 
term demographic and economic changes following damage, red-
zoning and response, recovery and rebuild operations; risk 
communication 
MU, UC, GNS, LU, UO, Opus; 
private providers of psycho-social 
support and research 
Geotechnical Engineering Liquefaction-related land and foundation 
damage;  
aerial photography liquefaction;, slope 
stability data 
Risk assessments/safety issues; liquefaction mapping; establishing 
lateral displacement; mapping rockfall and landslide risk, including 
modelling rockfall trajectories; geotechnical life safety assessments 
UC; GNS; UA; Tonkin & Taylor; 
international research partners; 
Opus; other  private providers 
Structural  
Engineering 
Seismic performance of structures –
buildings and infrastructure. 
Structural damage and safety assessments; dynamic updates of state 
of current knowledge to inform agencies and the industry; basic 
research on seismic performance of wide range of structures and 
buildings; seismic site response effects, acceptable seismic risk of 
older buildings, retrofit solutions for heritage unreinforced masonry 
buildings. 
Leads: UC and UA – included GNS, 
BRANZ and private providers; 
international research partners 
Lifeline & Natural 
Resources Engineering  
Seismic performance of lifelines & pipe 
networks/systems; disaster waste 
management; groundwater contamination 
of aquifers 
Damage and performance assessments, including interdependence; 
waste disposal options; reinstatement of lifeline services; design new 
lifeline approaches and solutions 
UC; UA; GNS; Opus; private 
providers, international research 
partners 
 List Of Acronyms (In Alphabetical Order) Used In Table B1: 
 
BRANZ – Funded by New Zealand Building Research Levy to invest in building research & 
provide testing, research advice & knowledge. (www.branz.co.nz) 
CCC – Christchurch City Council (one of the three territorial authorities impacted by the 
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence) (www.ccc.govt.nz) 
CERA – Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority; established by the Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Act (2011). 
DBH – Department of Building and Housing, a branch of the Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and Employment (MBIE). (www.dbh.govt.nz) 
DBH/EAG – Department of Building and Housing Engineering Advisory Group ( 
www.dbh.govt.nz/canterbury-earthquake-eag)  
ECAN – Environment Canterbury, the Canterbury Regional Council, New Zealand (the 
regional council impacted by the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence). 
GNS – GNS Science, New Zealand Crown Research Institue (CRI) established by the CRI 
Act (1997). 
LIDAR – remote sensing technology using lasers to measure distance  
MU – Massey University, New Zealand 
MoE – NZ Ministry of Education 
MSD – NZ Ministry of Social Development 
NZTA – New Zealand national transport authority 
Opus – private NZ research provider 
OPMSA – Office of the Prime Minister’s Chief Science Advisor -  www.pmcsa.org.nz 
SDC – Selwyn District Council (one of the three territorial authorities impacted by the 
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence) (www.selwyn.govt.nz) 
Stanford – Stanford University, California, US (www.stanford.edu) 
Tonkin & Taylor – private NZ research provider 
TEC – New Zealand Tertiary Education Commission 
Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu – tribal organisation with traditional authority in the Canterbury 
region (www.ngaitahu.iwi.nz/te-runanga-o-ngai-tahu) 
UA – University of Auckland, New Zealand 
UC – University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
UC Berkeley – University of California, Berkeley campus, US 
UO – University of Otago, New Zealand 
VUW- University of Victoria, Wellington, New Zealand 
WDC – Waimakariri District Council (one of the three territorial authorities impacted by the 
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence) (www.waimakariri.govt.nz) 
 
 
 
